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Abstract: Does performance in strategic settings depend on whether players realize 
that an optimal way to play is feasible? We introduce a zero-sum game of perfect 
information, simple enough to allow  computation of optimal play yet sufficiently 
complicated that most participants initially fail. This borderline solvability-by-humans 
makes it a suitable research tool for experimentally evaluating if play is affected by 
whether it dawns on a subject that an analytic solution may be possible. Our design 
includes a way to control for such insight. We also examine how learning transfer 
across games affects subsequent learning towards optimization. Applications include 
the facilitation of learning how to plan ahead when actions are needed today but the 
consequences are temporally distant. 
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Epiphany –       
a sudden manifestation or perception of the 
essential nature or meaning of something 
[Webster’s Dictionary] 
 
I. Introduction 
Understanding the workings of the human mind can be crucial to economists. 
Economic outcomes depend on behavior, and  behavior  is shaped by how people 
reason. In order to make reliable predictions it is useful to know the type of reasoning 
triggered by various situations and the effect on behaviour and outcomes. 
  Our paper contributes to the literature which seeks related insights through 
experimental games.
1
  We now invite our readers to ask themselves, before reading on, what they 
would do in this game. 
 We focus on an old but mostly little-known game that we call 
The Game of 21; G21 for short. A variant of this game was used in the ‘immunity 
challenge’ of an episode of the TV series ‘Survivor’, as discussed in Dixit (2005). The 
rules: Two players, call them White and Green, take turns. White begins. To start off, 
he can choose either 1 or 2. Green observes this choice, then increments the “count” 
by adding one or two. That is, if White chooses 1 Green can follow up with 2 or 3; if 
White chooses 2 Green can follow up with 3 or 4. White then observes Green's choice, 
and again increments the count by adding one or two. The game continues with the 
players taking turns, each player incrementing the count by one or two. The player 
who reaches 21 wins. 
   
                                                 
1 For an entry, see the paper by Nagel (1995) which introduced so-called guessing games, the survey in 
chapter 6 in Camerer’s (2003) book Behavioral Game Theory which covers many other games, and our 
further discussion and references in section II below.   2 
G21  features a second-mover advantage. Any strategy  which  whenever 
possible selects a multiple-of-three is dominant for Green.
2
  Did you figure this out?  Our experience says many people  don’t  grasp  it, 
including “professional” conference audiences. Dixit (2005) recounts the failure of 
participants in the reality-TV show ‘Survivor’ in figuring out the dominant strategy in 
a variant of G21.  In the ‘21 Flags Game,’ aired on episode 6 of ‘Survivor Thailand,’ 
each of two teams could remove 1, 2 or 3 flags each turn in their quest to remove the 
last flag. The team that lost this game had to vote off one of its members, decreasing 
its chance of winning the eventual million-dollar prize. Dixit notes that players got 
almost every choice wrong; they should have aimed to leave the other tribe with a 
multiple-of-four.  
 Such a strategy ensures 
that  along the path of play Green  makes  the  choices  3, 6, …, 18, 21, and thus 
guarantees victory. Furthermore, in any sub-game where a co-player has not chosen a 
multiple-of-three in the preceding stage, the  player  to move  may use a  dominant 
strategy for that sub-game involving choices of multiples-of-three from that point on. 
Why this difficulty in figuring out a finite two-player zero-sum game with 
perfect information? On further reflection one realizes there may be (at least) two 
reasons:  First, a player may not realize the analytical nature of the problem; our 
experience using  G21  for teaching suggests even economics students often  fail to 
realize that an analytic solution is possible. Once the solution to this game is known, it 
seems difficult to fathom that people may not realize an analytic solution is possible. 
But bear in mind that most situations in life lack dominant strategies. Depending on a 
                                                 
2 Green has many dominant strategies since he may make any choice after histories where he has 
previously not responded with  multiple-of-three  at some point  (such histories will, of course, be 
counter-factual if Green follows a dominant strategy). The general insight that some player in G21 must 
have a dominant strategy can be gleaned (on a little reflection) by abstract principles (that G21 is a finite 
two-player zero-sum two-outcome games with perfect information) from Ewerhart (2000).   3 
subject’s associations, he or she may not think of the possibility that an optimal way 
to play G21 could exist.
3 Second, even if one realizes that logical analysis may hold 
the key, finding the answer may prove too difficult  as it requires  going  through 
several steps-of-reasoning.
4
  Epiphany! That’s what a player needs to master G21. To study how players 
may achieve epiphany, we introduce a second, but shorter game: The Game of 6, G6 
for short, is played the same way as G21 except whoever reaches 6 wins. Try G6 on 
anyone, and they quickly figure out that they can win by picking 3 as Green. 
 
How might playing G6 facilitate learning to play optimally in G21? There are 
two plausible learning mechanisms—(a) mimicking: i.e., a player learns that playing a 
multiple of 3 is a winning strategy in G6, and may simply imitate this strategy in the 
longer G21 game, or (b) playing G6 makes players realize that an analytic solution is 
possible in  G21.  We could call this a mini-epiphany. Next, s/he discovers  and 
understands the dominant strategy. We call this full epiphany, or complete epiphany.
5
Whatever the form of learning across games, if any learning occurs, then a 
person playing G6 is likely to carry some insight of an analytical solution over to G21. 
 
                                                 
3 Or consider G21 with three rather than two players taking turns; no dominant strategy exists in this 
modified game. Is it really so obvious when to look for, or not conceive of, dominant strategies? 
4 First, and trivially, realize that a choice of 21 wins. Second, realize that if one chooses 18 then a win 
can be guaranteed. Third, realize that if one chooses 15 then one can similarly secure 18, and so on. 
Ultimately, if one chooses 3, and then a multiple-of-three in every subsequent move, then one can 
secure a win. According to the implicitly suggested metric, this calculation requires six steps of 
reasoning. Note that the described process resembles backward induction, but in fact is not backward 
induction since no reference is made to optimal subsequent co-player choices. The process considers 
each player i in isolation and works backwards on i's nodes assigning an optimal choice only if this can 
be done regardless of subsequent opponent choices, and so exhibits non-existence except if a dominant 
strategy is uncovered for each sub-game. 
5 Our initial approach to this research project had been to study the second approach to learning: i.e., to 
induce mini-epiphany in subjects (using G6) and then to understand whether this helped trigger 
complete epiphany, and so on. Both our referees and co-editor brought up the issue that, while that was 
our intended purpose, the results we observed could also be explained by the hypothesis that players 
were mimicking the multiple-of-3 strategy that they learnt in the shorter game when playing the longer 
game. We think this is a fair argument, and have included, ex-post, the learning mechanism of 
mimicking. However we present evidence at the end of section IV.0 that the type of learning we 
observe seems to be through the ‘mini-epiphany and complete epiphany’ mechanism, rather than the 
mimicking mechanism.   4 
Cooper  and  Kagel (2008, 2009) offer supporting evidence for the possibility of 
learning transfer across games when the context is similar, and G6 and G21 are similar 
except that the latter game involves much longer paths of play. They also note that 
Fudenberg and Kreps (1988) suggest “…players infer about how their opponents will 
act in one situation from how opponents acted in other, similar situations”. 
We have two treatments. In the first subjects first play G21 several times and 
then G6 several times, in the other the order is reversed (G6 before G21). We ask: will 
subjects playing G21 in the latter treatment play better or learn faster than subjects 
playing G21 in the former treatment? This is our first research question. 
Our second research question concerns whether and how subjects arrive at 
complete epiphany, i.e., how do they discover the dominant strategy in G21, given that 
they have already played G6. Is it the case that, over time and as subjects play more 
and more games, they learn gradually in the sense that they choose multiples-of-three 
at incrementally lower counts in G21 (epiphany by the backdoor)? Or could it be that 
subjects show no evidence of gradual learning before epiphany occurs (learning with 
a leap)? We study the patterns, focusing on the data from the treatment where subjects 
play G6 before G21.  
How does this approach add to the previous literature on strategic reasoning in 
games? We answer this question in section II, as we review related literature. 
Thereafter, section III describes our experimental design, section IV reports results 
regarding our two research questions, and section V concludes. 
 
II. Related literature 
  To see how we add to preceding literature, let us first describe a version of the 
classical guessing game: N>2 players simultaneously pick numbers in the range [0,   5 
100]. Whoever is closest to 2/3 of the average wins/splits a prize. The unique Nash 
equilibrium (also the result of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies) is 
for each player to pick 0. However, in experiments, choices are all over, 0s are rare, 
and 0s never win (unlike choices around 20); see e.g. Nagel (1995) and Camerer 
(2003, chapter 5). 
  This  is  sometimes  taken to illustrate  subjects’  bounded reasoning  abilities. 
High choices certainly make it clear that the players collectively do not manifest the 
degrees of mutual beliefs about mutual beliefs… about rational choices that might 
correspond to various rounds of iterated dominance. This does not, however, reveal 
much about any individual’s ability to reason deeply. A smart and potentially deep-
reasoning individual should avoid the equilibrium strategy of 0 since most of the 
others choose high numbers!
6
  The game we study avoids such interpretational  ambiguities.  Playing the 
dominant multiples-of-three strategy is a best response regardless of beliefs about 
others. Failure to choose a feasible multiple-of-three very likely indicates failure to 
work out the dominant strategy.  Moreover, we can infer something regarding the 
number of steps-of-reasoning a subject is capable of by observing how early in the 
count of a game he starts choosing multiples-of-three (cf. footnote 
 
4).  
  Another contribution of ours is best understood with reference to recent work 
on cognitive hierarchy or level-k models which can account for subjects’ play in many 
experiments  using simultaneous-move games.  The  key idea,  pioneered by Nagel 
                                                 
6 Camerer (2003, p.17) recognizes this confound and recounts how one player he knew to be very 
clever chose 18.1. Asking him later to explain his choice, he said he knew 0 was the equilibrium but 
believed his colleagues (all were Board members at Caltech) would only average two steps of 
reasoning and pick 25. He optimized on that assumption, adding a little extra in case an odd high 
number were also chosen.   6 
(1995) and Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995),
7 is that players are heterogeneous in terms 
of strategic sophistication. For example, level-0 players may choose randomly across 
all strategies. Level-1 players assume everyone else is level-0, and best respond; 
level-2  players  assume everyone else is a level-1 player,  and best respond;  etc.
8
  But this is in contrast with recent findings by Grosskopf and Nagel (2008), on 
guessing games with N=2. Two players simultaneously pick numbers in the range of 
[0, 100] and whoever is closest to 2/3 of the average number wins/splits a prize. The 
change from N>2 to N=2 alters the game’s properties: a choice of 0 is now dominant. 
Student  subjects  as well as  professional audiences at economics and psychology 
conferences made choices that were not significantly different from the choices made 
in N>2 treatments. With N=2, 90% of the students and 63% of the professionals chose 
a dominated strategy! If one were to apply a level-k model with a distribution of 
players concentrated around small but non-zero k’s it would suggest most players (all 
those for whom k>0) should choose 0, at odds with Grosskopf and Nagel’s data.
 
Estimations of such models, for specific games, indicate a distribution of players 
concentrated around small but non-zero k’s. Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) report 
that “many subjects’ systematic deviations from equilibrium can be confidently 
attributed to non-equilibrium beliefs rather than irrationality” (p. 1767), thus 
describing data from games where subjects presumably succeeded in optimizing given 
their beliefs of others’ strategies. 
9
                                                 
7 For further developments or applications, see Bosch-Domènech et al. (2002), Camerer et al (2004), 
Costa-Gomes  and  Crawford (2006), Costa-Gomes  et al  (2001), Crawford (2003), Crawford  et al. 
(2008), Crawford and Iriberri (2007a, 2007b), Gneezy (2005), Ho et al. (1998), Östling et al (2008), 
and Selten et al. (2003).  
 
8 Some versions allow that level-k players best respond to some combination of players at level-k’, for 
k’ = 0, 1, …, k-1. See e.g. Camerer et al. 
9 In follow-up research, Chou et al. (2009) suggest that the failure of subjects to choose optimally in the 
2-person guessing game may rest with the failure of the experimenter to design instructions and 
procedures that allow subjects to properly grasp the game. They go to great lengths to achieve such 
control, and nevertheless meet with only limited success.   7 
Let’s take stock. It  seems  that  in some games it is easier for subjects to 
optimize than in others. We face the challenge of explaining how subjects calculate 
and learn what is in their best interest. This is a largely open research area, and we 
take  early  steps of exploration.
10
4
  G21  joins Grosskopf and  Nagel's  N=2  games  in 
having a dominant strategy which is  non-obvious to compute.  Our approach is 
different from theirs (as well as from almost all studies of level-k play) in that we 
have a game with a sequential structure rather than simultaneous moves. This feature 
enables us to get some insights regarding how close subjects come to optimizing (cf. 
footnote  ). Another difference is that we focus on learning and how learning is 
transferred across games, whereas most of the other work we cited looks at games 
played only once or games where subjects get no feedback between rounds. 
After we started our project we learnt of work by Gneezy  et al  (2010), 
involving similar games, conducted independently. G21  features counting to 21 in 
increments of one or two; Gneezy et al have players count to 15 (or 17) with steps of 
one to three (or four). Some patterns of play accord well across studies, but research 
questions differ. Gneezy et al don't consider our key notion of inducing epiphany 
through  playing a much  simpler game before playing  a more challenging  game. 
Rather they focus on patterns of learning across rounds of play of a given game, or 
games which are similar in terms of path-length. On the other hand, Gneezy et al 
explore issues concerning response times and talk-aloud protocols which we do not 
consider. 
                                                 
10 A different approach is developed by Johnson et al (2002) who employ the ‘Mouselab’ system to 
study patterns of information search in alternating-offer shrinking pie games. They report that players 
tend not to backward induct; indeed a minority did not even glance at the pie sizes in later rounds, 
making backward induction impossible.  Gabaix and Laibson (2000) develop a forward-looking 
algorithm for solving complex decision trees without invoking backward induction.   8 
McKinney and Van Huyck (2006, 2007) study depth-of-strategic-reasoning 
related issues in Nim, an ancient game named in modern times by Bouton (1901-02). 
Again some features of play accord between studies, but G21 and Nim are sufficiently 
different that a direct comparison is difficult.
11
 
 McKinney and Van Huyck also put 
more emphasis on identifying bounds of human reasoning; again they do not deal 
with whether playing a simpler game may induce faster learning in a more 
challenging version. 
III. Design 
  Our  subject pool was unusual. One of us was  teaching two sections of 
intermediate  microeconomics. The course involved discussion of experimental 
methodology and results.  To get the students  excited about the topic, they  were 
promised in-class experience of a “real” experiment, one generating data meant for 
publication. After some negotiation the Human Subjects Protection Program of the 
University of Arizona gave permission.
12
                                                 
11 Several people suggested to us that G21 is a version of Nim. However, no Nim game exists which has 
the same extensive game form as G21. While G21 and Nim both are finite two-player zero-sum two-
outcome games with perfect information, in G21 the root of any sub-game (other than at the count of 
20) has a binary choice set, a feature which cannot be preserved throughout any Nim game rich enough 
to allow as long paths of play as G21 requires. Moreover, Bouton’s (ingenious!) solution method, while 
similar to the pick-multiples-of-three solution of G21 in the sense that it too produces a method by 
which a winning position (“safe combination”) can be maintained through play, is very different in its 
details (which involve manipulations of binary scale of notation representations of positions) and does 
not apply to G21. Finally, the number of moves needed to win using a dominant strategy is not as 
unambiguously defined in Nim, making the link to steps-of-reasoning less straightforward. 
 Sessions were conducted at the Economic 
Science Laboratory. Since subjects were in class, we had no reason to make sure each 
was compensated for their time. We used a pay-a-random-subset-of-subjects approach 
12  The issue was that research experiments usually occur outside of class, since participation is 
supposedly voluntary in a way which classes are not. We got around this by providing an alternative 
lecture (on theory regarding the involved games) for students who wished to opt out (no one did). We 
acknowledge that, as a referee put it, one may “worry a bit about loss of control as students are engaged 
in reasonably long-run relationships”. On this dimension, the study of Gneezy et al complements ours 
in that they use a more standard set of subjects and nevertheless overall patterns of play in G21 shares 
the feature (as we will see) that subjects often fail to implement a dominant strategy.   9 
as advocated by Bolle (1990): two subjects from each treatment were selected at 
random (one for G21; one for G6) and paid $5 for each game won. 
  We had two treatments: in the G21-then-G6 treatment subjects first played G21 
five times and then G6 five times, in the G6-then-G21 treatment the order was reversed. 
Subjects were not permitted to communicate with each other once the experiment had 
commenced, other than through selecting their choices of integers. 
  The G21-then-G6 treatment had 42 participants comprising seven groups of six 
subjects. Each subject received a “player ID” (A, B, C, D, E, or F), read through a 
“subject disclaimer form”, and then got instructions with the rules of G21. Each pair of 
members of each group played G21 once, with new matches proceeding round-robin 
style with players alternating between White and Green positions.
13
We thus had seven groups, each featuring five rounds of play of G21, with 
three games (each with two players) per round. After all of these 7×5×3=105 games 
had terminated,
 Play began once 
subjects had spent sufficient time studying the rules of the game. No hard time limit 
was imposed. Game sheets for each round were collected only after the last pair of 
players in that round had finished playing.   
14
                                                 
13 The Appendix (with the online version of this paper) contains instructions, game sheets, and the 
schedule-cards/protocol for matching pairs of players across rounds (which followed a so-called 
Howell movement, commonly used for conducting contract bridge-pairs tournaments). The format of 
the game sheets we used was chosen to visually facilitate understanding the nature of the game and 
thus epiphany, at least compared with methods where the sequence of choices must be remembered 
mentally. 
 with a winner determined for each, instructions describing the rules 
of G6 were distributed, and round-robin play ensued as before, with another 7×5×3 = 
105 games. The G6-then-G21 treatment had the same format, except the order of the 
games was reversed. We had 30 participants, producing 5 groups. We thus had 5×5×3 
= 75 games of G6 and another 5×5×3 = 75 games of G21 in this treatment.  
14 Our data analysis, however, is based on only 104 of these games. One pair of subjects (round 1, 
group 4, players E and F) had not understood the instructions and played erroneously in their first 
round.     10 
 
  IV. Results 
  Epiphany in G21 involves the dawning on a player that s/he may have a way of 
playing that guarantees a win. This is a cognitive concept which we can only study 
indirectly. We use G6 as a tool to induce such insight in our subjects. The idea is that 
once subjects figure out that G6 is “solvable”—either by understanding the analytic 
nature of the game (i.e., mini-epiphany) or by learning that perhaps playing multiples-
of-3 may work in the longer game (mimicking)—they will start thinking that G21 may 
be solvable too since the games have a similar structure.
15
  This approach is meaningful only if two preliminary results hold: 
 Hence, when we analyse 
our data we will assume that subjects in the G6-then-G21 treatment reach some kind of 
insight before playing G21, while subjects in the G21-then-G6 treatment may or may 
not have reached any such insight before playing G21. Conditional on that maintained 
assumption, we then test our two main hypotheses mentioned in the introduction.  
 
PR(i) Most subjects playing five rounds of G6 realize that G6 may be solvable 
by rational calculation. (If they did not, our idea that such an insight extends to 
G21 would lose its basis.) 
 
PR(ii) Most subjects playing the Green position in G21 for the first time do not 
immediately figure out that choosing the multiples-of-three is the best they can 
do. (If they did, then our conjecture that subjects in the G21-then-G6 treatment 
may not have reached  complete  epiphany  before playing  G21  would be 
vacuous.) 
This section has three subsections:  in sub-section (IV.0) we  establish preliminary 
results PR(i) and PR(ii), and in sections IV.1-2 we consider our two main research 
hypotheses.  
 
                                                 
15 This need not mean that they figure out what the dominant strategy in G21 is, only that they will 
realize that it may make sense to look for a dominant strategy in G21.   11 
IV.0  Two Preliminary Results 
  PR(i) above is supported: most subjects playing five rounds of G6 realize that 
G6 may be solvable by rational calculation. Table 1 shows this with data from G6 for 
both treatments. 167 of 180 Green players (93 percent) play perfect games – that is, 
their first move is 3, and their second move is 6, at which point they win.
16
 
 
Table 1: Perfect Play in G6 
 
 
Notes: Columns 2, 4, and 6 (“Perfect Games”) list the relative number of G6 where 
Green played perfectly, for each round, by treatment and pooled. Columns 3, 5, and 7 
provide the associated percentages. 
 
PR(ii) is supported too: most subjects playing the Green position in G21 for the 
first time do not immediately figure out that choosing multiples-of-three is the best 
they can do. The evidence is in Table 2. Across treatments, in G21, only 49 of 179 
games (27%) are played perfectly.
17
   
 The rates of perfect play are especially low in the 
early rounds of the G21-then-G6 treatment (e.g. 2 out of 20, or 10%, in round 1). 
                                                 
16 There is no significant difference in perfect play of G6 between the G6-then-G21 and G21-then-G6 
treatments. 
17 There is a significant difference in perfect play of G21 between the G6-then-G21 and G21-then-G6 
treatments. This finding is central to our first main hypothesis, discussed further in the next subsection.  
Perfect Games Percentage Perfect Games Percentage Perfect Games Percentage
1 12/15 80 18/21 86 30/36 83
2 14/15 93 20/21 95 34/36 94
3 13/15 87 21/21 100 34/36 94
4 15/15 100 20/21 95 35/36 97
5 14/15 93 20/21 95 34/36 94
All rounds 68/75 91 99/105 94 167/180 93
G 6-then-G 21 G 21-then-G 6 Round Pooled  12 
Table 2: Perfect Play in G21 
 
 
Notes: Columns 2, 4, and 6 (“Perfect Games”) list the relative number of G21 where 
Green played perfectly, for each round, by treatment and pooled. Columns 3, 5, and 7 
provide the associated percentages. 
 
One final comment about PR(i) and PR(ii): In G6 a player might stumble on 
his optimal strategy serendipitously – if he flipped a coin he would choose 3 with 
probability ½ – and from there win almost for sure (169 out of 180 Green players 
chose 3; only two of those 169 Green players then failed to win in G6). It is much 
harder to stumble into the optimal strategy in G21. We can, however, control for this 
potential confound if we simply count the number of Green players in G21 who chose 
3; 113 out of 179 Green players did so. While this proportion is significantly greater 
than expected from a coin-flip, it is also significantly lower than the proportion of 
players who chose 3 in G6 (z = 7.1).
18
                                                 
18 Also, the difference in the proportion of persons playing perfectly in all rounds of G6 (93 percent) vs 
the proportion playing perfectly in all rounds of G21 (27percent) is overwhelmingly significant (Z = 
12.65). 
 The conclusion: more Green players in G6 than 
in G21 chose 3 because they figured out their dominant strategy before choosing. 
Furthermore, of the 113 Green players mentioned above, 52 (out of 75) were from the 
G6-then-G21  treatment, while only 61  (out of 104)  were  from the G21-then-G6 
treatment. If the main lesson from G6 was to mimic the choice of multiples-of-3 rather 
than transferring the knowledge that G21 is of an analytic nature (i.e., achieving mini-
epiphany after playing G6) we might have expected this difference in proportions 
between treatments to be larger. As it is, it is not statistically significant (z = 1.43).  
Perfect Games Percentage Perfect Games Percentage Perfect Games Percentage
1 3/15 20 2/20 10 5/35 14
2 5/15 33 3/21 14 8/36 22
3 6/15 40 4/21 19 10/36 28
4 5/15 33 7/21 33 12/36 33
5 8/15 53 6/21 29 14/36 39
All rounds 27/75 37 22/104 21 49/179 27
Round G 6-then-G 21 G 21-then-G 6 Pooled  13 
 
IV.1  The Impact of playing a simple game first  
  In light of our support for PR(i) and PR(ii), we now proceed to consider our 
first main research hypothesis: Subjects playing G6 figure out that an analytic solution 
is possible. It dawns on them that there may be an optimal way to play G21 too, or that 
mimicking the strategy of playing multiples-of-3 may work in G21.  Even if they do 
not figure out the optimal strategy right away, on balance they will play G21 better in 
the G6-then-G21 than in the G21-then-G6 treatment. 
We approach this in a few complementary ways. First we ask: does playing G6 
before G21 facilitate complete epiphany? Recall from the introduction our terminology 
that a subject has reached complete epiphany if he discovers and understands the 
dominant strategy in G21.  This  is a cognitive concept which we can only study 
indirectly. We compare frequencies of perfect play by Green players in G21 across 
treatments. The idea is that if a subject plays G21 perfectly this probably was no fluke; 
it is an indicator of complete epiphany.  Table 3 records the relevant data. Green 
players play G21 perfectly in the G6-then-G21 treatment 37% of the time, compared to 
21 percent in the G21-then-G6 treatment. This difference is significant at the 5% level 
(Z statistic = 2.20). 
     14 
Table 3: Comparing play in G21 across the two treatments 
 
 
Notes: The moment of epiphany  measure lists the number of subjects who reach 
epiphany  in that particular round as a proportion of all subjects playing in that 
treatment. 
 
The perfect play test refers to Green players only, and neither considers White 
players nor the dynamics as a subject plays five rounds of G21. We next introduce a 
more dynamic new metric which considers all players: moment of epiphany. To help 
with the definition, we first introduce a notion of indicated rationality.  
Definition  1:  Consider  i’s choice x  < 21 in  a given instance of G21. This choice 
exhibits indicated rationality if x is the smallest number such that: it is a multiple-of-
three and all i's subsequent choices in that game are all multiples-of-three. 
 
  Although it is technically possible for a winner’s indicated rational choice to 
be 21, she would be a very lucky winner and ‘rationality’ would play little part. It 
would require a glaring failure of rational play by at least one party for someone to 
pass up 18 or fail to win from 18.  
 
Definition 2: Subject i’s moment of epiphany occurs in round R∈{1,2,3,4,5} if R is 
the earliest round such that i has a choice x that exhibits indicated rationality, and in 
any rounds R’>R all i’s choices exhibit indicated rationality at the earliest available 
multiple-of-three. We additionally impose that i has a moment of epiphany only if she 
plays at least one round perfectly. (Note that a subject i may have no moment of 
epiphany.)  
 
Raw count  Percentage  Raw count  Percentage 
Perfect Play  27/75  37  22/104  21 
Median Indicated Rationality  6  12 
Moment of Epiphany in 
Round 1  5/30  17  3/42  7 
Round 2  4/30  13  3/42  7 
Round 3  2/30  7  2/42  5 
Round 4  2/30  7  3/42  7 
Round 5  1/30  3  4/42  10 
No moment of epiphany  16/30  53  27/42  64 
Measure 
G 6  -then-  G 21  G 21  -then-  G 6   15 
  Indicated rationality attempts to capture the number of steps-of-reasoning a 
subject displays in a particular game, while moment of epiphany tries to capture the 
moment when a subject works out the dominant strategy, i.e., when she achieves 
complete epiphany. Both measures are imperfect. For example, a player may stumble 
onto the choices 15, 18, and 21 without having achieved epiphany, and yet we would 
record 15 as the indicated rational choice.
19
  In definition 2, we impose the restriction that a player has a moment of 
epiphany only if s/he plays at least one round perfectly; the rationale is that this seems 
more defensible than the assertion that someone who still made mistakes in the final 
round had nonetheless understood the dominant strategy. 
 Some imprecision seems unavoidable in 
any measure.  We would be wary especially  when using these notions to obtain 
measures of any individual’s degree of rationality or insight. 
 
                                                 
19 Similarly, the following example shows that there is imprecision associated also with Definition 2. 
Suppose a player in the White position has fully worked out the dominant strategy of playing multiples-
of-three, but faces a Green player in that round who plays the dominant strategy, picking multiples-of-
three at each turn. Then the White player is denied an opportunity to pick a multiple-of-three in that 
round, and will have his moment of epiphany delayed by this measure. 
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G21-then-G6 
G6-then-G21   16 
Looking at play in G21 across our two treatments, we first note that the median 
choice with indicated rationality in the G6-then-G21 treatment is 6, while the median 
choice with indicated rationality in the G21-then-G6 treatment is 12 (see Table 3 and 
Figure 1). In a sense, the median number of steps-of-reasoning in the G21 games in the 
G21-then-G6 treatment is three (the steps involving 12, 15, 18, and 21; cf. footnote 4), 
while the median number of steps-of-reasoning in the G21 games in the G6-then-G21 
treatment is five (the steps being 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, and 21). Thus, playing G6 prior to 
playing G21 seems to increase the median steps-of-reasoning achieved by subjects 
from three to five in G21. A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of 
distributions shows we can reject the null hypothesis of both treatments being drawn 
from the same distribution at the 5%-level (p= 0.025). A k-sample test on the equality 
of medians yields the same conclusion.  
We next look at the distribution of the subjects’ moment of epiphany across 
the treatments. An important statistic here is the number of players who never achieve 
epiphany: 53 percent of players in the G6-then-G21 treatment and 64 percent in the 
G21-then-G6 treatment (see Table 3). These proportions are not significantly different 
(Z=0.93) from each other, and seem to suggest that some players may never work out 
the dominant strategy in G21; there just may be too many steps-of-reasoning involved. 
This is despite many of these subjects successfully working out the dominant strategy 
in G6 (either before or after playing G21).
20
In addition, the data suggests that playing G6 before playing G21 may not help 
this group of subjects achieve epiphany. However, among the group of players who 
do achieve epiphany (as indicated by our measure based on Definition 2), it appears 
  
                                                 
20 Once again this seems to point to the second learning mechanism – involving mini and complete 
epiphanies, rather than to the ‘mimicking’ mechanism. If players were simply mimicking the strategy 
they used in G6 then we would expect much higher numbers of players in the G6-then- G21 treatment to 
achieve complete epiphany in the G21 game.   17 
that playing G6 first does help some subjects achieve complete epiphany sooner. In the 
G6-then-G21 treatment, up to 37 percent of players (11/30) achieve their moment of 
epiphany by round 3, as opposed to 19 percent of players (8/42) who achieve their 
moment of epiphany by round 3 in the G21-then-G6  treatment, a statistically 
significant difference (Z=1.67).  More generally, the two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test for equality of distributions also shows we can reject the null hypothesis 
of both treatments being drawn from the same distribution at the 5%-level (p=0.017) 
and the k-sample test on the equality of medians confirms this conclusion.  A kernel 
density plot across 5 rounds of play (see below for explanation) illustrates this 
difference in Figure 2. 
 
 
We noted earlier that the moment of epiphany measure has some short-comings (e.g. 
footnote 13). While it shows that some particular player understood the dominant 
strategy by some moment, it does not exclude the possibility that it was understood 
before that moment. To view the data from yet another angle, we define epiphany 
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Figure 2  Kernel Density of Epiphany in Two Treatments  18 
delay, which identifies the latest moment when complete epiphany was demonstrably 
not achieved. To this end, we generate a scale 0→105 as follows: Each position in the 
first round of G21 is assigned 1→21; each position in round 2 is assigned 22→42 and 
so on up to 85→105 for the final round. We use this scale to record the last occasion 
when a player failed to choose an available multiple-of-three. 
 
Definition 3: Subject i’s epiphany delay is an element of {0, 1, ..., 105} identifying 
the last occasion when i fails to select a multiple-of-three when able to do so.
21
 
 If i 
never misses such an opportunity, then we assign 0 as i’s epiphany delay measure. 
Comparing epiphany delay in G21 across the two treatments, we find that in 
the G6-then-G21 treatment the mean epiphany delay is 53.66 with a standard deviation 
of 36.53. In G21-then-G6 the mean epiphany delay is 68.93 with a standard deviation 
of 29.2. That is, on average the location of the last error subjects make in the G6-then-
G21 treatment is 10 or 11 in the third round, while in the G21-then-G6 treatment it is 6 
in the fourth round. The difference between the means across these two treatments is 
significant (Z = 1.90) at the 5% level.  
                                                 
21 Subject i is able to choose a multiple-of-three every time his/her opponent has not played a multiple-
of-three in his/her turn.   19 
 
A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions narrowly 
fails to reject the null hypothesis of both treatments being drawn from the same 
distribution at the 10%-level (p=0.102) although a k-sample equality of medians test 
rejects the null at the 10%-level (p=0.056). The above kernel density plot in Figure 3 
is also suggestive of a difference between treatments. 
Taking these various measures together, we conclude that although one or two 
achieve only marginal statistical significance, all the differences are in the predicted 
direction and most are strongly so. This suggests that prior experience with a simple 
game of suitable structure does indeed  induce  learning, which  then  raises the 
likelihood of, or advances the moment when, epiphany will be achieved in a similar 
game of greater depth.  
 
IV.2  Learning within G21  
  We have seen that it takes time for subjects to learn to play the dominant 
strategy in G21. In this section we focus on how learning happens in G21 given that 
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subjects have played the simpler G6 game before. Thus, we focus on learning patterns 
from the G21 games in the G6-then-G21 treatment.
22
To consider learning, let us first look at how the indicated rationality measure 
evolves across rounds (see Table 4).  
  
 Table 4: Median Indicated Rationality 
 
 
 
After playing 5 rounds of G6, the median indicated rationality of subjects in 
round one is 15. Interpretation: after realizing that an analytic solution is possible, at 
least 50 percent of subjects appear to work out two steps-of-reasoning (cf. footnote 3) 
in the first round of G21.
23
                                                 
22 Note that using data from the G21-then-G6 would be inappropriate for answering the questions in this 
section since whatever delay in correct choices occurs may depend on the absence of understanding 
that an analytic solution is possible in that treatment. However, we sometimes report the results from 
the G21-then-G6 treatment, mainly to contrast it with the G6-then-G21 treatment. 
  In round two, they seem to work out one more step, with 
the median indicated rationality falling to 12. Then there is a jump, with median 
indicated rationality falling to 6 by round three, indicating five steps-of-reasoning by 
at least half of the subjects playing in this round. The median indicated rationality of 3 
by round five reflects the fact that, by the beginning of that round, almost half of the 
subjects have reached complete epiphany, and have worked out the dominant strategy. 
23 Once again it is important to note here that, had the learning mechanism from the simpler G6 game to 
the more complicated G21  game been ‘mimicking,’ one would likely observe much lower median 
indicated rationality in the earlier rounds of the G21 game in the G6-then-G21 treatment. The fact that is 
not the case, and that median indicated rationality falls across rounds (as seen in Table 4) is another 
piece of evidence that the learning mechanism is likely through the mini-epiphany and then complete 
epiphany mechanism. 
Round 1 15
Round 2 12
Round 3 6
Round 4 4.5
Round 5 3
G 6-then-G 21  21 
It is interesting to note that two levels of reasoning would seem to lead to insight on 
how to play G6 perfectly, and that the median subject playing G21 for the first time 
also seems to be able to reason out two steps. This may explain why although so 
many subjects (93 percent across the two treatments) play perfectly in G6, many of the 
same subjects fail to achieve complete epiphany in G21 even after five rounds. 
While there appears to be a steady learning process as the rounds progress on 
the part of the median subject, there is a substantial degree of heterogeneity in how 
quickly subjects learn to play the dominant strategy.
24 Many seem never to learn how 
to play (as indicated by their moment-of-epiphany measure), while a number of them 
appear to reach complete epiphany at or near the beginning.
25
We note an interesting difference between the two treatments in terms of 
learning when we confine ourselves just to those subjects who fail to reach complete 
epiphany. It appears that in the G21-then-G6 treatment, these subjects nevertheless are 
making progress towards learning the dominant strategy; in round one their median 
indicated rationality is 18 and by round five it falls to 10.5. On the other hand, in the 
G6-then-G21 treatment there is no evidence of learning by this  (smaller)  group of 
 So at any given point 
during play of a series of G21  there is likely to be i)  players who have reached 
complete epiphany; ii) other players who have understood that an analytical solution 
is possible (or have otherwise gained some insight) through playing G6 first and are 
lowering their onset of indicated rationality in subsequent rounds; and iii) yet other 
players who have failed to achieve any insight and who still ascribe victory to chance.  
                                                 
24  This result joins a wealth of research suggesting ways individuals differ, from the ‘Big five’ 
personality dimensions of extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism and openness to 
experience (John and  Srivastava, 1999) to psychological inclinations like sensitivity to emotional 
concerns (e.g. Krone 2003) or (of more relevance to us) level of thinking regarding the rationality and 
beliefs of others (e.g. many of the references cited in section II). 
25 Thirty percent of subjects have their moment of epiphany by round 2 (see Table 3).   22 
players; in round one their median indicated rationality is 15 and by round five it 
remains at 15. 
 
V. Conclusions 
  How do you defeat a Gordian knot? How do you make an egg stand on end? 
Wise men failed to come up with answers until Alexander the Great and Christopher 
Columbus came along. Their legends teach us about how fame and fortune may be the 
reward for clever insights. 
  How do humans play games? We suggest that an adequate answer requires 
understanding how humans reach clever insights. Most of economic theory assumes 
that decision-makers best respond to their beliefs. Yet optimizing is often complicated 
and there is an abundance of related issues to explore: Do decision makers understand 
when problems admit analytical solutions? Does the answer to the previous question 
depend on their life experiences? How efficient are humans in calculating solutions? 
What are the processes by which they learn to optimize? 
  We explore related issues in connection with a two-player zero-sum game of 
perfect information: G21 is much simpler than chess, possible to figure out optimal 
play for, and yet sufficiently complicated that most humans do not figure it out at least 
at first. The borderline solvability-by-humans makes it suitable as a research tool for 
shedding light on questions like those in the previous paragraph. 
To structure our examination of human insights in games, we introduce a 
second, but shorter game, G6, and study how playing G6 first facilitates learning to 
play optimally in G21. There are two plausible learning mechanisms— (a) mimicking 
or (b) learning that an analytic solution is possible in the shorter game and transferring 
this knowledge to the more complicated game.     23 
We propose an experimental design to study how learning transfer occurs 
across the games of G6 and G21. Our results confirm that experience with G6 improves 
performance in G21 (according to a variety of measures).  Our evidence also seems to 
point to the  fact that learning across these two games occurs through the second 
mechanism (achieving a mini-epiphany that an analytical solution is possible and then 
attaining nirvana (complete epiphany) when the dominant strategy of the more 
complicated game is learned). If learning were mainly through mimicking we would 
have been likely to observe a lot more perfect play as well as much earlier moments 
of epiphany in the G21 game in the G6-then-G21 treatment. Instead, what we observe is 
a more gradual unwrapping of the optimal strategy: consistent with the player having 
realized an analytic solution is possible, but working this analytic solution out in 
steps. 
We also examine the nature of  learning once the subject realizes that an 
analytic solution is possible. Here we do not have a preconceived hypothesis. It turns 
out that learning towards  complete epiphany  is gradual  to some degree  in most 
subjects.  However,  subjects exhibit a lot of associated heterogeneity. Experience 
matters in possibly predictable ways, but there is a lot of individual variation. 
Very little discourse in economics seems to be concerned with how human 
minds get primed to engage in rational thinking, and how insights are reached.
26
                                                 
26 Although not game-theoretically anchored, discussions of entrepreneurial discovery and creativity 
have some of this flavour. See e.g. Hayek (1978/1984) and Kirzner (1985) for arm-chair reasoning, and 
Demmert  and  Klein (2003) for a related out-door experiment. They  test whether the strength of 
financial incentives matters to whether subjects figure out the most efficient method (inverting of a 
plastic stool) for transferring water from spot A to spot B, thereby getting insights-by-analogy on a 
conjecture about entrepreneurial discovery by Hayek and Kirzner. Demmert and Klein use epiphany to 
refer to entrepreneurial discovery but their usage differs from ours as they exclude understanding that 
results from deliberate effort. 
 More 
research is concerned with how players reason about others (see our section II and the 
references to the literature on level-k and cognitive hierarchy models). We suggest 
   24 
that these research goals are complementary, and that future work should keep both 
goals in mind. 
 While humans may have a language instinct with which to acquire 
proficiency in spoken language, strategic thinking, like written language, has to be 
learned the hard way. The connections between our findings and broader questions, 
such as why societies value schools, or how we may best structure teaching to foster 
insight and improve learning (e.g., begin with the simplest example of a concept), 
should be kept in mind although at the moment tackling such questions remains 
beyond our scope. Applications however could include the facilitation of learning 
how to plan ahead when actions are needed today but the consequences are 
temporally distant.  We have not attempted here to examine  particular  economic 
settings but one may suspect that the array of relevant ones is vast and could include, 
for example,  choices regarding  education,  nuclear waste storage, marketing, and 
warfare.  25 
Appendix 
Instructions, game sheets, guide cards for game matchings: 
{Subjects’ instructions were written on the same page as the game sheets. We explained 
verbally that movements for game matching should proceed according to schedule cards 
that we distributed. These assigned students to “tables” and explained who would act as 
the White/Green player. We indicate here the look of the instruction /game sheet for the 
game of twenty-one (the game of six was handled analogously) and the schedule card for 
one of a group’s subjects.} 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
THE GAME OF 21 
 
Welcome! The rules of the game are: 
 
Each player takes turns playing the game, with the white player beginning. To begin, white 
can choose either the number 1 or the number 2, by circling one of them. The green player 
then plays by incrementing white’s choice by 1 or by 2. That is, if white had circled the 
number 1, then green can choose either the number 2 or the number 3. If, instead, white had 
chosen the number 2, then green can choose either the number 3 or the number 4. Green uses 
a cross to mark his/her choice. The game continues with each player incrementing the other’s 
choice by 1 or by 2, until one player reaches 21. The player who reaches 21 first wins.  
 
 
WHITE PLAYER:  Circle the number you choose in each round. 
GREEN PLAYER:  Use a cross to mark the number you choose in every round. 
 
  WHITE ALWAYS BEGINS. PLAYER WHO REACHES 21 FIRST WINS 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21 
       
             
WHITE PLAYER ID: ______________________ 
GREEN PLAYER ID: ______________________ 
WINNER ID:             ______________________ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
PLAYER B’s SCHEDULE 
 
GAME 1:   Plays against A at Table 1.  Position: Green 
GAME 2:  Plays against C at Table 3.   Position: White 
  GAME 3:   Plays against E at Table 2.   Position: Green 
  GAME 4:   Plays against F at Table 2.  Position: White 
  GAME 5:   Plays against D at Table 3.  Position: Green   26 
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